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On Being Stuck in Time 
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Abstract:  
It is sometimes claimed that non-human animals (and perhaps also young children) 
live their lives entirely in the present and are cognitively ‘stuck in time’. Adult 
humans, by contrast, are said to be able to engage in ‘mental time travel’. One 
possible way of making sense of this distinction is in terms of the idea that animals 
and young children cannot engage in tensed thought, which might seem a 
preposterous idea in the light of certain findings in comparative and developmental 
psychology. I try to make this idea less preposterous by looking into some of the 
cognitive requirements for tensed thought. In particular, I suggest that tensed thought 
requires a specific form of causal understanding, which animals and young children 
may not possess. 
Keywords: Mental time travel, tensed thought, causal understanding 
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1. Introduction 
Is the mental life of (at least some) non-human animals fundamentally quite similar to 
our own, or is the relationship between human beings and the rest of the animal 
kingdom marked by some deep discontinuity? Amongst those who have held the 
latter view, two, on the face of it quite different, approaches stand out. Many writers 
have taken language to be the key feature that sets humans off from the rest of the 
animal kingdom, and have appealed to animals’ lack of language to both explain and 
make good the claim that their minds are radically unlike our own.1 However, there is 
also a tradition of writers who have seized upon a different aspect of mental life to 
articulate what the key difference comes to. Take, for instance, the following passage 
from Friedrich Nietzsche’s ‘Untimely Meditations’:  
Consider the cattle, grazing as they pass you by: they do not know what is 
meant by yesterday or today, they leap about, eat, rest, digest, leap about 
again, and so from morn till night and from day to day, fettered to the moment 
and its pleasure or displeasure, and thus neither melancholy nor bored. This is 
a hard sight for man to see; for, though he thinks himself better than the 
animals because he is human, he cannot help envying them their happiness. 
(Nietzsche 1983, pp. 60f.). 
We can set aside Nietzsche’s particular views on who comes out better here. The key 
claim, as it is sometimes put, is that animals live their lives entirely in the present, or 
that they are cognitively stuck in time. 2 Perhaps the same is true of young children, 
                                                
1 Davidson (1982) is an obvious contemporary example. 
2 For some other versions of this claim, or at least similar claims, made at various points in the history 
of philosophy see, e.g., Aristotle (1930, 453a4-13), Schopenhauer (1999, p. 30), Bergson (1988, pp. 
93f.), Dennett (2005, pp. 168f.). In psychology, influential sources for the claim that animals’ cognitive 
life is restricted to the present include Koehler (1927, p. 272) and (as one referee has pointed out to me) 
Donald (1991, p. 149). Of course, it is not necessary to see this claim as being in competition with the 
claim that the deep discontinuity between humans and other animals turns on the fact that the latter 
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we might add. Adult humans, by contrast, are said to be capable of cognitively 
transcending the boundaries of the present; they can engage in mental time travel. 
Beyond such metaphorical descriptions, however, it actually turns out to be 
surprisingly hard to get a grip on what exactly the distinction at issue is meant to 
come to. Consider, for instance, a recent debate that was triggered by a study on scrub 
jays carried out by Nicky Clayton and Tony Dickinson (1998). The study ingeniously 
exploited the fact that scrub jays eat both worms and peanuts, but much prefer worms. 
At the beginning of the study, the birds were given a number of training trials during 
which they had the opportunity to cache worms in sand trays; but they also learned 
that, while those worms were still edible 4 hours after caching, they were no longer 
edible 124 hours after caching. Furthermore, they learnt that cached peanuts were still 
edible after either of those delays. During the test phase, birds were given an 
opportunity to cache, first, one of these two types of foodstuff in one side of a tray, 
and then, following a 120 hour delay, the other type of foodstuff in the other side of 
the tray. Four hours after the second caching, they were allowed to search the tray for 
foodstuffs.3 The crucial finding was that the location of the birds’ searches depended 
on the delay between the initial caching of the worms and the subsequent search. If 
the worms had been cached in the first caching session, 124 hours before test, then the 
jays preferred to search for peanuts. If the worms had been cached just 4 hours before 
test, the jays preferred to search for worms.  
Endel Tulving calls this an “ingenious and convincing demonstration” of quite 
sophisticated memory abilities in the birds studied by Clayton and her colleagues, but 
then he goes on to say:  
                                                                                                                                      
lack language. Bennett (1964), whom I will discuss below, is one example of a philosopher who thinks 
that the two claims are connected.  
3 The experimenters actually removed the cached items before testing to ensure that the birds were not 
able to base their searches on olfactory cues. There was also a control involving scrub jays that were 
not given the training trial, but then went through the same test phase.  
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The only thing missing is evidence that they have human-like conscious 
recollections of their worm and nut caching activities. They may just ‘know’ 
what kind of food is where, and what state it is in – fresh or rotten – without 
knowing how or why they know it. (Tulving 2001, p. 1512).  
I take it that this is Tulving’s way of putting the point that, despite Clayton & 
Dickinson’s findings, scrub jays might nevertheless be incapable of mental time 
travel, and that their cognitive abilities thus fall short of our own in quite a 
fundamental respect. Similar views have been expressed in a series of papers by 
Thomas Suddendorf (e.g., Suddendorf & Busby, 2003; Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997, 
2007). At the same time, there have also been rejoinders from Clayton and her 
colleagues (Clayton et al., 2003), and from other comparative psychologists who have 
claimed to have demonstrated mental time travel in animals, questioning the empirical 
tractability of the claims made by Tulving and Suddendorf (see, e.g., Eichenbaum et 
al., 2005). 
I think it is worth bringing out, though, that, even in the short passage I have 
quoted from Tulving (2001), there actually seem to be at least three quite different 
ideas at work as to what the crucial difference between humans and other animals that 
is at issue might come to.     
(1) One distinction Tulving alludes to, which has emerged from the literature 
on adult memory, is that between remembering (or, as he puts it here, “conscious 
recollection”), on the one hand, and knowing, on the other. The basic thought here 
goes back to the idea of a distinction between two different kinds of memory, for 
which Tulving (1972) originally coined the terms ‘episodic memory’ and ‘semantic 
memory’. As it is usually understood, the remembering/knowing distinction is meant 
to indicate that episodic recall of particular past events, i.e. the type of remembering 
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that constitutes mental time travel into the past, involves a specific kind of conscious 
experience, typically called recollective experience. By contrast, such recollective 
experience is absent when retrieval is merely a matter of calling up previously 
acquired knowledge from semantic memory. It is thought that this difference can be 
tapped into empirically in studies in which participants are asked questions about a 
number of previously presented items and are instructed, in each case, to classify their 
responses as ones that are based on ‘remembering’ the item, on the one hand, or just 
‘knowing’ that the item was there, on the other. Adult participants in such studies can 
readily make sense of this instruction, and their responses can be selectively 
influenced by a number of task variables at encoding or retrieval.  
(2) Another, potentially quite separate, issue that Tulving alludes to is whether 
the scrub jays studied by Clayton and her colleagues just know, say, 124 hours after 
caching, that there is no point going back to the side of the tray where the worms have 
been cached, or whether, in addition, they can also be said to know how or why they 
know this. Thus, the implied idea here would be that mental time travel involves some 
form of metacognition or self-conscious reflection, i.e. a capacity to reflect on one’s 
past experiences as the source of one’s present knowledge, or more generally to 
appreciate relationships between one’s own mental states at different times. This idea 
is particularly prominent in Suddendorf’s way of framing the question as to whether 
or not animals are capable of mental time travel (cf. Suddendorf & Busby, 2003; 
Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997, 2007; see also Perner, 2007).  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, though, some animal researchers and 
developmentalists have found neither of the above two ways of drawing a distinction 
between those capable and those incapable of mental time travel very helpful (see, 
e.g., Clayton et al., 2003; McCormack & Hoerl, 2001). It is difficult to see, for 
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instance, how to construct a non-verbal measure that might be deemed equivalent to 
the type of task used to explore the remembering/knowing distinction in adults. 
Similarly, we might grant that the ability to recollect the past seems to play a crucial 
role in allowing us to grasp the sources of some of our knowledge – how or why we 
know what we do4 – but it is at least not obvious why the ability to recollect the past 
should itself, in turn, depend on such metacognitive abilities.     
At any rate, it is easy to get a sense that the basic issue that Nietzsche had in 
mind when he wrote that animals are “fettered to the present” gets somewhat lost 
here. Of course, one response to this might be that this is not very surprising – 
perhaps the kind of intuition articulated by Nietzsche is just too crude and can easily 
be shown to be false by studies such as Clayton & Dickinson’s. I want to suggest, 
though, that that would be the wrong response. 
(3) In addition to the two distinctions I have already mentioned, there is a third 
one that is at least hinted at in the above quotation from Tulving, which I would like 
to look at in more detail. Even though there are other passages in which Tulving 
seems to agree with Clayton & Dickinson (1998) that their studies show memory for 
‘what, where and when’ in scrub jays, the wording in this passage actually suggests a 
slightly different reading. Note that part of what Tulving seems to be concerned with 
is the question of whether we should explain the birds’ behaviour in terms of notions 
such as ‘what kind of food is where, and what state it is in – fresh or rotten’. At least 
on the face of it, this contrasts with an explanation in terms of tensed notions, such as 
‘was cached a short while ago’ or ‘was cached a long time ago’.5 This is the contrast I 
want to concentrate on in what follows. 
                                                
4 See, e.g. Zentall (2005), see also Hoerl (2001), for a similar point 
5 Of course, the former type of notion may also be seen as employing tense, i.e. the present tense. I will 
shortly try to make a case for saying that the crucial distinction at issue here is indeed one between 
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In short, I believe that there is a very basic difference between two ways of 
being sensitive to the passing of time, which provides perhaps the most 
straightforward way of giving substance to the idea that animals are incapable of 
mental time travel. I will refer to this difference as that between engaging in tensed 
thought, on the one hand, vs. merely updating one’s model of the world as time goes 
by, on the other. It is relatively easy to state what the difference consists in; what will 
take more work is making plausible the idea that it is indeed a difference as basic at 
this that is at issue in the claim that animals are stuck in time, i.e., that the claim 
doesn’t come out obviously false once it is framed in terms of this difference. 
In the next section, I will give a general outline of the basic distinction I have 
in mind, and show how it might be put to use in interpreting Clayton & Dickinson’s 
findings. In section three, I will show how the same distinction can also be applied to 
show that learning to perform or recount sequences of actions need not involve a 
grasp of tensed notions, and compare this view with one recently put forward by John 
Campbell (2006), according to which such sequential learning abilities do involve a 
grasp of tensed notions, albeit ones that are more primitive, in a crucial respect, than 
those at work in mature human thought about time. Finally, in section four, I will 
make a suggestion as to what sorts of learning abilities do, on my view, provide 
evidence for a grasp of tensed notions.  
 
2. Mere updating vs. temporal thought: the basic distinction 
Even though variants of the claim that animals are stuck in time have made repeated 
appearances throughout the history of philosophy, it is not easy to find detailed 
arguments for it. In what follows, I will draw on an argument offered by Jonathan 
                                                                                                                                      
notions that employ tense and notions that do not employ tense at all, even though we might have to 
use present tense morphology to capture the latter in English.  
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Bennett (1964), which runs as follows.  Suppose that we observe an animal behaving 
in a particular way some time after it has been in a certain kind of situation, or has 
done a certain thing. Bennett’s example is that of a dog retrieving a bone from a 
location where it had buried the bone a while ago. On the basis of this observation, we 
might be tempted to attribute to the dog a belief about the past, such as ‘A bone was 
buried there’. Yet, as Bennett points out, if it is to yield an explanation of the dog’s 
behaviour, the attribution of such a belief about the past must be accompanied by the 
attribution of a further, general, belief, such as the belief ‘Buried bones tend to stay 
put’. The first thing that might strike us as being problematic here is the attribution of 
that second, general, belief. However, according to Bennett, the real difficulty lies 
elsewhere. If the dog’s behaviour can only manifest possession of the two beliefs in 
combination, it is unclear what saying that there are nevertheless two distinct mental 
states, one dealing with the past and one dealing with the general, might come to. It 
seems that we can only speak of two separate beliefs if we can distinguish them by 
the role they have within the dog’s cognitive life, and it is difficult to see how we 
could do so, if they issue in behaviour only when combined. 
Bennett (1976, p. 103) summarizes the general point of the above argument by 
saying that, in the case of non-linguistic animals, “the attribution of a past belief [i.e. a 
belief about a past occurrence] can be effectively challenged by a lower-level, more 
economical, attribution in which the past is only introduced causally”. The general 
way in which such a challenge might proceed is further fleshed out by Peter Smith 
(1982, p. 434), who says: “Where [one putative explanation] would explain present 
behaviour by reference to a past belief combined with a general belief, the 
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undercutting explanation would posit a past acquisition of a [...] present-tensed belief 
[...] and refer to the general propensity of states to persist over time.”6 
I want to suggest that something like the line of thought that Bennett and 
Smith describe here is the real source of the intuition that animals are stuck in time. 
However, I also think that Smith slightly mis-characterizes the key issue at stake. 
Where Smith says that the undercutting explanation ascribes to the dog a present-
tense belief acquired in the past, rather than a past-tense belief together with a general 
belief, I think we should say that, on the undercutting explanation, there is a sense in 
which the dog’s belief lacks tense altogether. Arguably, saying that the dog employs a 
present-tense belief still suggests that the dog operates with a distinction between how 
things are now and how they are at other times.7 What Bennett and Smith’s 
undercutting strategy seems to give us, instead, is a way of making sense of the dog’s 
behaviour without appealing to any notion of other times at all.  
The key general move in the undercutting strategy as described by Smith, I 
believe, is to show how an explanation of a given set of behaviours over time might 
be available on the level of facts about beliefs, and about the conditions that 
determine their persistence, rather than on the level of how (if at all) time itself is 
represented in those beliefs.8 Once the issue at stake has been put in those terms, 
                                                
6 I am simplifying the dialectical situation here. Bennett (1976), from which the first quotation in this 
paragraph is taken, actually goes on to criticise the argument from Bennett (1964) that I have sketched. 
He suggests that non-linguistic behaviour might, after all, warrant the ascription of separate past and 
general beliefs, if there is a range of different behaviours the animal engages in that can be explained 
by attributing a past belief that combines with a number of different general beliefs or vice versa. 
Smith’s (1982) paper, from which the second quotation is taken, considers this suggestion and argues 
that it underestimates the strength of Bennett’s (1964) argument, i.e. the undercutting strategy can be 
made to work even in cases where there is a range of behaviours as envisaged by Bennett (1976). For 
the purposes of this paper, I will assume that Smith’s defense of Bennett’s (1964) argument is sound. 
7 See also the discussion of Campbell’s (2006) views below.  
8 On some accounts of propositional attitudes, we should actually hold back from crediting the dog 
with beliefs at all if the argument offered here is correct. Elsewhere in this paper, I also speak of 
animals’ (and childrens’) ‘model of the world’, which is perhaps a more neutral expression. 
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however, it should also be clear that the example used by Bennett and Smith is in fact 
only one example on a much wider spectrum.  
Consider again, for instance, Clayton & Dickinson’s (1998) scrub jays and the 
claim that they demonstrate episodic or episodic-like memory of past events. Teresa 
McCormack (2001) has offered a critique of this claim, which picks up on statements 
like the following from Griffiths, Dickinson and Clayton:  
In terms of […] criteria for episodic memory, the animal must be able to 
encode the information based on a single, personal experience that occurred in 
the past, and then accurately recall the information about what happened, 
where and when, at a later date. (Griffiths, Dickinson and Clayton 1999, pp. 
76f.) 
Griffiths et al. are here trying to offer a set of criteria for episodic memory that sets 
aside some of Tulving’s claims about the involvement of a particular kind of 
conscious experience and metacognitive abilities in episodic memory – claims that are 
difficult to bring to bear in studies on animals. As McCormack argues, though, it is 
far from obvious that the caching studies actually demonstrate that scrub jays have 
anything like episodic memory even by Griffith et al.’s criteria. She points out that it 
is plausible to think that the jays’ behaviour is governed by some sort of interval timer 
that is entrained during the learning trials in which the birds find out that the worms 
decay within 124 hours. The idea of such a timer, an internal mechanism that is 
sensitive to the time that has elapsed since a certain stimulus, has been used to explain 
performance of both animals and humans on a variety of timing tasks, and there are a 
number of different theoretical models of how such timers might operate (see 
Wearden, 2001, for a review). For present purposes, the basic idea is that, in Griffith’s 
et al.’s experiment, cashing of worms triggers such a timer, the state of which changes 
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in a systematic way as time elapses, and during the learning trials only certain states 
of the timer become associated with the availability of edible worms. In the test trials, 
in the absence of any other cues, it is then the state of the timer at a given time since 
the cashing of worms that determines whether the birds search for food or not. Yet, if 
this is the correct description of the mechanisms underlying the birds’ behaviour, it 
seems potentially quite misleading to say, as Griffiths et al. do, that the birds recall 
information about when the worms were cached. As McCormack puts it, 
Of course, in principle, […] such a timer might be used to work out the 
temporal context of the previous caching event (analogous to using 
information about the time elapsed on a stop-watch to work out when it was 
switched on). However, there would be no need to assume that the birds 
actually derive that previous context. (McCormack, 2001, p. 289). 
There is scope for further discussion of the details of McCormack’s challenge and 
how exactly it needs to be spelled out to apply to Griffiths et al.’s findings (see de 
Kort et al., 2005, pp. 169f.). The basic point I want to bring out is that this challenge 
can actually be seen as a version of Bennett and Smith’s undercutting strategy. The 
critical point is that the function of the interval timer might simply be to determine 
how long the jays retain the belief that there are worms in a certain location, so that, 
after a certain period of time has elapsed, it simply no longer occurs to them to search 
the side of the tray where the worms were cached.9  
In the background of both Bennett and Smith’s as well as McCormack’s 
arguments, there seems to be a more general picture of animal cognition, which might 
                                                
9 This is not to say that this is the only cognitive role timing mechanisms can play. Peacocke (1999), 
for instance, develops an account according to which a sensitivity to temporal relations, mediated by 
such mechanisms, does in fact also have a crucial role to play in understanding the past tense. 
However, he also notes that “[t]o possess a sub-personal mechanism which is, when functioning 
properly, […] temporally sensitive is of course not yet to have mastered temporal thought” (Peacocke, 
1999, p. 90), which is in effect the same issue that is at stake in the above quotation from McCormack 
(2001).  
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be summarized as follows. At any one time, the animal simply entertains a model of 
how the world is or might be. Whilst the ingredients of that model have been acquired 
in the past, they are of significance to the animal only in as far as they can inform its 
actions or expectations. Over time, elements of the model can change either because 
they get superseded by new information, or because their persistence is governed by a 
timing mechanism.10 Either way, the result is simply that of the model being updated. 
Previous information that is no longer relevant to action or expectation is simply 
discarded, rather than being retained, say, in the form of past-tensed beliefs.  
The key idea here is thus that of a fundamental distinction between two 
different ways in which cognition can be sensitive to the passing of time, which we 
might call mere updating vs. tensed thought. At the end of the previous section, I 
suggested that the idea that animals, and possibly also young children, are unable to 
engage in tensed thought might provide one way of giving content to the claim that 
they are stuck in time. My aim in this section was to show just how, at least in the 
case of animals, ascriptions of tensed thoughts might be challenged using a particular 
sort of undercutting strategy. What is revealed by this strategy is precisely how 
certain forms of behaviour might equally well be explained by the idea of the animal 
operating with a model of its environment that is maintained and updated in various 
ways as time goes by, but in which each update simply replaces its predecessor 
without making room for the idea of other times, as times at which things were (or 
will be) different from how that update has it.  
                                                
10 There are also cases in which it might be more appropriate to say that the function of the timing 
mechanism is to suppress certain elements of the model for periods of time. This type of description 
might be applied, for instance, to capture the role interval timers have in preventing hummingbirds 
from revisiting a food source for a certain period of time, thus allowing the food source to replenish (cf. 
Henderson et al., 2006). I should also add, here, that we need to allow that the model an animal 
operates with might be fairly disunified, or, as we might also put it, that an animal might be seen to 
operate with several different models, which are updated in different ways and on different timescales, 
relative to different sets of practical purposes.  I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for alerting me 
to this latter point. 
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3. Sequential Learning, Imagination and Tense 
A natural first response to what I have said so far is that I must have misunderstood 
the issues at stake in the existing debate over mental time travel in animals and 
humans that writers such as Tulving (2001) and Suddendorf and Corballis (2007) are 
engaged in; I have simply changed the topic. In particular, the existing debate is 
concerned with mental time travel as a particular form of exercise of the imagination, 
or at least something akin to it, and it is at least not obvious that having beliefs about 
the past requires such an imaginative ability. It is frequently pointed out by authors 
such as Tulving that much human thinking about the past and the future does not 
involve mental time travel at all, for instance when we recall the date of the battle of 
Hastings.  
Furthermore, the response might continue, it is simply preposterous to suggest 
that animals can’t form beliefs about the past, and even more so for the case of young 
children. There is a wide variety of research that might be seen to provide evidence 
against this suggestion by showing that animals are capable of learning to perform not 
just individual actions, but ordered sequences of actions. Similarly, it has been shown 
that even quite young children are capable of retaining knowledge about familiar 
sequences of events – such as going to a fast-food restaurant, or visiting the doctor – 
in the form of scripts. On the face of it, learning about the correct order of events in a 
sequence requires an ability to keep track of the elements of the sequence that have 
already been performed and the ones that are still to come. There needs to be some 
sensitivity to temporal facts in place if an animal is to carry off the sequence or a child 
is to recount a script in the right order. Thus, it may again seem that the issues I have 
been talking about can’t be the same issues that are at stake in the existing literature 
 14 
on mental time travel, where it is usually assumed that it is a live option that animals 
and young children are incapable of mental time travel, even though they can learn 
about sequences. 
 We can put both of these points into focus by looking at a view recently put 
forward by John Campbell (2006), which contrasts with the view I have sketched. On 
Campbell’s picture, animals and young children do have a rudimentary notion of the 
past and the future, but the key difference between them and us consists in the fact 
that their temporal horizon is, so to speak, much smaller than ours. Thus, for instance, 
a child recounting a fast-food restaurant or a going-to-the-doctor script might be able 
to grasp temporal relationships between the different elements within each script, but 
might be at a loss when it comes to understanding the question as to which of two 
things she did more recently: go to the doctor or eat at a fast-food restaurant. The way 
in which Campbell expresses this idea is as follows. He says we should credit the 
child with tensed notions – for instance a notion of ‘now’, which is governed by the 
general token-reflexive rule for ‘now’ that any token of it refers to the time at which it 
is produced. Yet, he also holds that there is a difference in meaning between the 
child’s ‘now’ and ‘now’ as understood by an adult, because the underlying domain of 
times is different (and similarly for other tensed notions the child employs). 
The domain of times over which this [token-reflexive] rule is defined will not, 
of course, be times drawn from our ordinary range of linearly organised times; 
they will themselves be times defined in terms of the temporal framework 
provided by the script.  Within each script times are temporally related; but we 
cannot express temporal relations between times identified in different scripts. 
(Campbell, 2006, p. 6) 
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Is there an alternative to the kind of view that Campbell puts forward? Here, too, it 
seems that one alternative to postulating a grasp of tenses, even one that is fairly 
primitive when compared with a mature grasp of tenses, is to make use of a 
distinction between tensed thought and a more simple type of sensitivity to temporal 
relations that involves only the updating of a model.  
 Note, first of all, that it is possible to mount an argument against Campbell’s 
view that mirrors, at least to some extent, Bennett’s argument as presented in the 
previous section. As in Bennett’s argument, we start with a specific sort of behaviour 
over time as our explanandum. What needs to be explained, in this case, is what 
enables a child correctly to recount or re-enact, say, a sequence of three events, A, B 
and C.  Campbell’s view, in effect, offers an explanans that comes in two parts. It 
implies that we must credit the child both with an ability to think of the order in which 
A, B and C are arranged, and with the ability to orient herself within this order using 
tensed notions. The critical sense in which, on Campbell’s account, the child’s 
cognitive abilities fall short of those of mature thinkers is that the notions in terms of 
which the child thinks about the order in which A, B and C are arranged have no 
application outside the script.  
 Now, one kind of worry one might raise here concerns the last point: If there 
is a sense in which a child is indeed capable of thinking of B as coming after A, and 
of C as coming after B, what exactly prevents the child from applying the same 
notions also, say, to relations between events within the script and others outside the 
script? However, I think this worry is actually a symptom of a more fundamental 
problem. As in Bennett’s argument, what we should ask is what justifies us in 
crediting the child with two separate types of cognitive ability, given that recounting 
or re-enacting a script necessarily seems to involve combining them. Again, there 
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seems to be a lower-level undercutting explanation available, according to which it is 
not an ability to think of the order in which A, B and C are arranged, but rather an 
ability to think of A, B and C in the right order that underlies script-learning. Thus, as 
before, the key move in the undercutting strategy consists in pointing out how the 
behaviour in question can be explained by appealing to processes that govern what 
happens to elements of the child’s model of the world over time, instead of appealing 
to representations of temporal relations within the model in order to explain the 
child’s behaviour over time. As the child becomes familiar with a certain type of 
sequence of events, she acquires a routine for updating her model of the world in a 
particular sequence, thinking of B after thinking of A, and thinking of C after thinking 
of B. It is at least not obvious that this also requires that the temporal relations 
between A, B and C be themselves represented within the model.11  
 Yet, this seems to be an obvious point at which to bring in an appeal to 
imagination. Perhaps there is a primitive way of acquiring scripts for familiar 
sequences of events that doesn’t involve the use of tenses, as I have suggested. But 
perhaps Campbell is also right that we can credit children and animals with a grasp of 
tenses, if, in addition to using their knowledge of scripts for recounting or re-enacting 
familiar sequences, they can also use it to imagine, say, what will be the case in a 
little while, at a later stage in the sequence that is currently unfolding, or 
imaginatively undo stages in the sequence that have already happened.   
                                                
11 A similar thought is fleshed out further in McCormack & Hoerl (1999), who relate research on 
children’s acquisition of scripts to a view in linguistics according to which aspectual notions (e.g., 
completed, ongoing…) are grasped before tensed ones (e.g., past, present…) (see Wagner, 2001, for a 
recent discussion). McCormack & Hoerl (1999) suggest that children’s recounting or re-enacting 
scripts might indicate an ability to mark events successively as, e.g., ongoing vs. completed, as they go 
through the script. This ability appears to be more primitive than a grasp of tenses, though, in that it 
need not involve use of the notion of the time at which an event happens. A child might first think of an 
event as ongoing, and then as completed, without being able to grasp, say, at the time when she thinks 
of the event as completed, that there was a time when it was ongoing. In contrast, thinking of an event 
as past, say, arguably involves assigning it a position in a domain of times, as is also brought out by the 
quotation from Campbell (2006) above.  
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I think this suggestion encounters a problem, though, as soon as we try to spell 
out in more detail exactly how imagination is meant to come in here. To illustrate, 
consider a person who is having dinner in a busy restaurant. They have just ordered 
and are waiting for their starter. While doing so, they look at the neighbouring table, 
at a group that arrived earlier and are already tucking into their dessert. I think we can 
distinguish between two slightly different types of imaginative project our protagonist 
might engage in at this point: (i) they might imagine having already finished their 
starter and main course, and eating their dessert, just like the group at the 
neighbouring table; or (ii) they might imaginatively advance time and think of the 
situation that will actually obtain in the future when they will get to their dessert 
themselves.12 One way of describing the difference between (i) and (ii) is that, in (i), 
our protagonist imagines a counterfactual state of affairs as actual, whereas, in (ii), 
they imagine a state of affairs that is actually yet to come as ongoing.13 On the face of 
it, it is only the second type of imaginative exercise that involves mental time travel; 
the first might simply be described as involving travelling between different possible 
worlds. The problem is that, in order to distinguish between (i) and (ii) in the first 
place, it seems that we already have to appeal to a grasp of tenses, on the part of our 
protagonist, and to the idea that, in the case of (ii), the imaginative project that they 
are engaged in is itself formulated in terms of the future tense. Thus, I think we can 
accept that mental time travel consists in or involves a particular form of exercise of 
                                                
12 Both types of imagination mentioned here might require the ability to set aside current desires or 
other mental states in imagination. The development of this ability is explored in experiments carried 
out, e.g. by Atance & Meltzoff (2006) and by Suddendorf & Busby (2005), which claim to investigate 
the development of mental time travelling in children. However, precisely because that ability might be 
required for either form of imaginative exercise mentioned above, it should be clear that there is a 
further aspect of mental time travel that those experiments don’t tap into.   
13 A similar distinction is sometimes drawn in the literature on the development of counterfactual 
reasoning. It has been argued that some developmental studies might have over-estimated children’s 
command of counterfactuals, because the correct answer to the counterfactual test question could be 
arrived at by engaging in purely hypothetical reasoning, whereas children of a similar age fail 
counterfactual tasks that require ‘thinking back in time’ and considering the particular events that 
actually happened. See Beck et al. (2006) for discussion. 
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the imagination, or at least something akin to it. Yet, the ability to engage in the right 
kind of imaginative exercise that’s at issue already presupposes a grasp of tenses; it 
cannot be what explains such a grasp. 
 However, I believe that the issue I have just sketched might also give us a hint 
as to the sort of explanation we need to look for if we want to account for the ability 
to engage in mental time travel. The key question it raises is how children might give 
substance to the distinction between events that are not part of the present scene 
because they’re merely possible, not actual, and events that are not part of the present 
scene because they belong to the future (or the past).14 I think at least some of the 
ingredients for an answer to this question can be found in some recent work in 
comparative and developmental psychology, which I will discuss in the next, final, 
section of this paper.   
 
4. Tensed Thought and Causal Understanding 
In the first section of this paper, I mentioned (and expressed some sympathy with) a 
common criticism that psychologists have levelled at the way in which the notion of 
mental time travel has been fleshed by authors such as Tulving (2001) and 
Suddendorf and Corballis (1997, 2007). The criticism is that crucial elements of their 
characterization of mental time travel seem to rule out formulating behavioural 
criteria by which mental time travel could be demonstrated in animals or young 
children. In contrast to some of what Tulving and Suddendorf and Corballis say, I 
have suggested that we should think of the crucial question at issue in the claim that 
animals and young children are stuck in time (i.e., incapable of mental time travel) as 
                                                
14 See also Martin, 2001, p. 280, writing about episodic memory: “The infant needs to make sense of 
how there can be specific, and hence actual, events of which it has [...] conscious awareness, but which 
are nevertheless not part of the present scene”. 
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that as to whether we can credit them with tensed thought at all. Yet, because we are 
familiar with tense primarily as a feature of sentences, it may be thought that the 
account I have offered is ultimately vulnerable to the same criticism as those other 
writers’ accounts, in that it might seem that the only conclusive way in which tensed 
thought can be manifested is by engaging in tensed talk. I think such a reaction 
misconstrues the account I have offered, though, and I will try to show in this final 
section how some existing empirical work might actually be seen to tie in with my 
account.  
 Thomas Zentall (2005, 2006) has recently claimed that demonstrating mental 
time travel in animals requires presenting them with an unexpected question. This 
seems to me quite an apposite description of where at least part of the real empirical 
challenge in this area lies. If the arguments I have offered in this paper are along the 
right lines, there are a number of types of behaviour over time that animals and 
children can engage in that can be explained by appeal to processes operating on 
elements of the individual’s model of the world over time – governing, say, their 
persistence (see section 2), or the order in which they succeed each other (see section 
3) – rather than by invoking a grasp, on the part of the individual, of the distinction 
between past, present and future. Note, though, that this type of explanation seems 
available only in cases where there are certain stable temporal features in the 
individual’s environment – i.e. the time worms typically take to decay, or the 
sequence in which certain event-sequences typically unfold – which the individual has 
already been exposed to, so that timing or sequential learning mechanisms can 
become entrained to them. Thus, for instance, a child’s becoming familiar with certain 
sequences of events and learning a script for them might simply be a matter of the 
child learning to perform or think of certain events in a certain temporal order, i.e. do 
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or think of, first A, then B, and then C. Crucially, though, if a child were to 
demonstrate that she can also reason about event sequences for which she does not yet 
have a script because she has not actually encountered them before, the above type of 
explanation could not be applied.  
 The key question we should therefore ask is: What are circumstances in which 
children do have to think about event sequences that they have not encountered 
before, and about the order of events in those sequences? I think a very good example 
can be found in studies recently carried out be Cristina Atance (2006). One of the 
tasks she gave children was to put on an ant costume that consisted of two parts – an 
ant body and an ant head with large antennae. Crucially, the two parts of the costume 
have to be put on in a specific order, because if you put the head on first, the body 
part won’t fit over the antennae. Intuitively, it is unlikely that children can recruit an 
already existing script to solve this task. Rather, it seems that they have to work out 
the order in which to put on the two parts of the costume. 
 What does it take to work out the order in which the two parts of the costume 
have to be put on? Clearly, part of the issue here is that children need to recognize 
certain spatial facts, such as that the ant head is bigger than the opening at the top of 
the body. But the kind of reasoning required here is also concerned with a particular 
sort of causal relationship, namely one in which a particular outcome is dependent on 
a sequence of events, performed in the right order. The desired effect – wearing the 
ant costume – is dependent not just on carrying out the two actions of putting on the 
body and putting on the head, but on putting on the body before the head. I want to 
suggest that a grasp of these sorts of causal relationships might play quite a basic role 
in the emergence of the ability to engage in mental time travel. 
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At the end of the previous section, I suggested that one key developmental 
question in this context is how children give substance to the distinction between 
events that are not part of the present scene because they are merely possible, not 
actual, and events that are not part of the present scene because they belong to the 
future (or the past). In other words, what makes a certain kind of exercise of the 
imagination a case of mental time travel, rather than merely a case of travelling 
between different possible worlds? A grasp of causal relations might provide at least 
part of an answer here. Clearly, one general thing that distinguishes between other 
possible worlds and other times is that, whereas there are causal connections between 
what is the case in the present and what is the case at other times, there is no similar 
causal connection between the actual world and other possible worlds. But I think 
there is also a more specific role that the particular type of causal relationship at issue 
in Atance’s experiment plays in making intelligible just how causality and time are 
connected here.15 As I said, the causal relationship here is one where a particular 
outcome is dependent on a sequence of events, performed in the right order. As such, 
grasping it involves not just the ability to think about (or imagine) first putting on the 
body and then putting on the head, but also the child’s seeing how her wearing the 
ant-costume depends on events actually happening in that order rather than any other. 
It is a grasp of this type of constraint, I think, which allows the child herself to give 
substance to the thought of the events she is thinking about as themselves being 
arranged in a specific temporal order, rather than her just thinking of them in that 
order. And this, in turn, allows us to credit her, not just with an ability to imagine 
                                                
15 There is in fact a range of the type of 'temporal-causal' relationships exemplified by Atance's task, in 
which an overall outcome depends on the order in which two or more events happen. Children’s 
understanding of these types of relationships has also been explored, using quite different 
methodologies in Povinelli et al. (1999) and McCormack & Hoerl (2007). In these studies, children 
under 4-5 years typically perform quite poorly, indicating a lack of a grasp of the relevant temporal-
causal relationships 
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wearing the ant costume, but with the ability to think about her wearing the ant 
costume as something that, even though it is not yet the case, will actually be the case 
in the future.  
In other words, understanding the type of causal relationship at issue in 
Atance’s task, in which a particular outcome is dependent on the sequence in which 
two events happen, involves two things. It involves seeing a connection between what 
is the case and what could be the case, i.e. how a certain state of affairs might come 
about. However, at the same time, it also involves seeing why what could be the case 
is not yet the case. What explains why a certain state of affairs that might actually 
obtain in the future does not yet obtain is precisely that further things have to happen 
between now and then in order for it to obtain. We may think that this is a very simple 
thought, but I think it goes to the heart of the distinction between thinking of an event 
as one that will (or won’t) actually happen in the future, on the one hand, and merely 
thinking of it as possible. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, I have sought to explain and make plausible one way of understanding 
the claim that animals and young children are stuck in time and incapable of mental 
time travel. On this way of understanding, the claim turns on the idea that animals and 
young children cannot engage in tensed thought. I have contrasted the ability to 
engage in tensed thought specifically with a more primitive type of sensitivity to 
temporal relations that involves a variety of processes operating on the individual’s 
model of the world over time, but without distinctions between how things are at 
different times entering into the model itself. This more primitive sensitivity, I have 
suggested, can explain a variety of timing and sequential learning abilities. Crucially, 
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however, it depends on stable temporal features of the environment – how long a 
certain thing usually takes, or in what order certain types of events usually happen – 
that the individual has already been exposed to. By contrast, in the final section I 
introduced a task in which children had to think about, i.e. plan, a sequence of events 
of a type they had not already come across before. What I sought to bring out in 
particular was how the ability to think about such a sequence, at least in this case, 
depends on a grasp of a certain type of causal relationship, in which the overall 
outcome depends on the order in which two events happen. And I closed with a 
suggestion as to how a grasp of such causal relationships might be seen to play a key 
role in the ability to engage in tensed thought, in that it allows the subject to give 
substance to the distinction between the idea of a possible event, on the one hand, and 
the idea of an event that will (or won’t) actually happen in the future.   
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